In a companion case, Nationwide News v Wills} Brennan, Deane, Toohey and GaudronJJ also invalidated a Commonwealth law that prohibited the publication of material calculated to bring die Industrial Relations Commission into disrepute, on the basis that it infringed such an implied freedom.
Yet aldiough die Court's decisions correcdy identify the inhibiting effect of the impugned legislative provisions on freedom of speech, in our opinion they could not be based on the existence in the Constitution of implied limitations on federal power. On the other hand, the High Court could have held that the relevant legis lative provision violated a different implication tiiat is at least supported by current audiority.
Implied Limitations on Federal Power
In die leading Engineers case,1 2 3 the High Court condemned judicial censorship of extravagant use of Commonwealdi power. The High Court pointed out diat 'possible abuse of powers is no reason in British law for limiting the natural force of die language creating them'.4 The extravagant use of federal power presented a political issue, which required a political response: as long as it was within power, it could not be invalidated by the Court. Four members of the Court said in a joint judgment:
[T]he extravagant use of the granted powers in the actual working of the Constitution is a matter to be guarded against by the constituencies and not by the courts. . . If . . . the representatives of the people of Australia as a whole . . . proceed to use their national powers to injure the people of Aus tralia considered sectionally, it is certainly within the powers of the people themselves to resent and reverse what may be done. No protection of this court in such a case is necessary and proper.5
They identified the correct method of constitutional interpretation as 'in the actual terms of the instrument their expressed or necessarily implied meaning', thus ad mitting that there was a role for implication in constitutional interpretation. The role of the technique of implication was never disowned by the High Court. But this role was a limited one, and the only implications that could be made were those that must be 'necessarily implied' from 'the actual terms of the instrument'.6 The Court was not free to limit the language of a federal power or to invent implied prohibitions upon the exercise of federal power.
This mediod of interpretation was accepted by later courts. In Adelaide Com pany o f Jehovah's Witnesses v Commonwealth,7 Latham CJ stated that 'In the ab sence of a relevant constitutional prohibition it is not a proper function of a court to limit the method of exercising a legislative power'.8 The Court took the view that, except for express constitutional prohibitions, the legislative power of the Commonwealdi and State parliaments was as plenary as that of the British Parliament. The Court's role was limited to deciding whether die State or federal legislature had power to enact the law. The Court invalidated federal laws only if diey could not be supported by one of the heads of power in s.51 of die Commonwealdi Constitudon. In implying a right of freedom of communicadon in reladon to die govern ment of the Commonwealdi, the High Court has, as an intellectual matter, etfecdvely discarded the interpretadve technique diat it has used since 1920.
Representative Democracy and Freedom of Communication
In its 1992 decisions, the High Court generated controversy because, contrary to accepted canons of construcdon, it had suddenly discovered a new entrenched, but implied, right to freedom of communicadon. The High Court drew an implicadon of freedom of communicadon reladng to Commonwealth governmental affairs from the system of representadve government diat the Constitution creates.
Is There an Implied Constitutional Right of Freedom of Communication ? 73
The Constitution certainly provides for a system of representative democracy, which involves the idea of government by the people through their elected represen tatives.9 This system is based mainly on s.7 (senators directly chosen by the people of die State) and s.24 (constitution of House of Representatives). But the Court's invocation of these sections goes no further than to show diat die Consdtudon pro vides for a system of representative government in the terms of those sections. The constitutional blueprint for representative government was deliberately limited. As Dawson J pointed out, 'much is left to the Parliament concerning the details of the electoral system to be employed in achieving representative democracy '.10 Despite express provision for a right to vote, the Court ruled as recendy as 1975 diat 'representative democracy' does not demand equality of population in federal electorates. The suffrage is surely the core of representative democracy, botii con stitutionally and practically. But the Court would not imply restrictions upon the federal parliament's power to interfere with the weightage of votes.* 11 Yet now the Court has taken the view that representative government cannot effectively exist widiout an implied right of freedom of political communication.
To bolster its conclusion, die High Court embarks upon a lecture on civics, describing a number of characteristics of desirable or good government. It makes a number of unobjectionable factual statements, perhaps hoping that diose who criti cise die decision will be reduced to questioning the truth of these statements. It draws togedier a miscellany of obiter dicta from earlier decisions from around the world about the practical importance of free speech to good government. Some of these cases are from jurisdictions with express guarantees of freedom of speech.
But the Australian Capital Television and Nationwide decisions are conspicu ously devoid of reasons why these attractive factual considerations elevate freedom of expression to a right enshrined in the Commonwealdi Constitution. This is their real weakness, and the Court made litde headway in overcoming it. Much of the discussion about representative government bears greater resemblance to an ama teurish exercise in political science than it does to a legal interpretation of the consti tutional text. "Fake for instance die Chief Justice's lecture on the necessity of free speech to ensure the accountability of members of parliament in a system of repre sentative government:
Indispensable to that accountability and diat responsibility is freedom of communication, at least in relation to public affairs and political discussion. . . Absent such a freedom of communication, representative government would fail to achieve its purpose, namely, government by the people through their elected representatives; government would cease to be re sponsive to die needs and wishes of the people and, in that sense, would cease to be truly representative.12
Mason CJ is concerned here that representative government must achieve its pur pose, yet the Constitution, in providing for representative government, does not stipulate that die best or most desirable form of representadve government -if such a form can be idendfied -be realised. The Chief Jusdce is also concerned that government be truly 'responsive to the needs of die people'. These are fine matters for a citizen to be concerned widi.
Deane and Toohey JJ's judgment reveals a similar intrusion of non constitutional consideradons:
The people of the Commonwealdi would be unable responsibly to dis charge and exercise die powers of governmental control which the Constitudon reserves to diem if each person was an island, unable to communi cate widi any odier person. The actual discharge of the very funedon of vodng in an elecdon or referendum involves communicadon. An ability to vote intelligendy can exist only if die idendty of die candidates for elecdon or die content of a proposed law submitted for die decision of die people at a referendum can be communicated to die voter.13
Deane and Toohey JJ reveal a concern diat die people 'responsibly' exercise dieir right to vote. They implicidy deplore die nodon diat each person could be made an island, and are concerned that each person should exercise the franchise 'intelligendy'. But aldiough we share each of diese concerns, we do not see how such concerns consdtudonalise a right to free speech.
The majority's reasons were essendally derived from their own beliefs radier dian die text of die Constitution.14 W e are curious as to why die people are pre sumed to have not intended to give the Parliament plenary power, when widi a few specific excepdons die very words of the Consdtudon diey created provides no con trary indication and die parliamentary model diey knew best was possessed of un limited powers and when they rejected the example of die United States about how to limit diese powers. The Australian people divided governmental power, but did not limit it.
The process of implication itself is fraught widi difficulty. How are the judges to identify just what fundamental rights will be protected ? Such a process is inherendy [I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a foundation for die implica don of general guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms. To make such an implicadon would run counter to die prevailing sendment of the framers diat diere was no need to incorporate a comprehensive Bill of Rights in order to protect the rights and freedoms of cidzens. That send ment was one of the unexpressed assumpdons on which the Consdtudon was drafted.15
Neverdieless, die process of implying rights in die Consdtution is acceleradng. In a dissendng judgment in 1991, Deane and TooheyJJ implied a consdtudonal guarantee of equal legal treatment: die underlying equality of die people of the Commonwealdi under die law and before the courts.16 They would have invali dated a Commonwealth sentencing law diat left the duradon of die sentence to be determined by State law, so diat die minimum sentence varied from State to State. The majority view of Mason CJ, Dawson, and McHugh JJ in diat case is preferable. They correcdy held diat no implicadon was able to be made diat die Consdtudon demanded diat federal laws operate uniformly diroughout the Commonwealdi and diat diey not be discriminatory.
The right to freedom of polidcal communicadon is more an unexpressed assumpdon dian an implicadon necessarily made. An 'unexpressed assumpdon' dif fers from 'an implicadon necessarily made' in that die former is an extraconsdtudonal nodon, whereas die latter is part of die consdtudonal document. As Dawson J stated, 'If implicadons are to be drawn, diey must appear from die terms of die instrument itself and not from extrinsic circumstances'.17 He went on to say that 'The nature of die society or, more precisely and accurately, the nature of the federadon which die Consdtudon established, is to be found within its four comers and not elsewhere '.18 One of the most ironic aspects of the Court's judgment in the political advertis ing case is that it has essentially adopted the approach to constitutional interpreta tion of Murphy J, despite having decisively rejected it while he was on the Bench. In support of an implied freedom of speech, Murphy J actually appealed to the in stitution of representative government. In M iller\ TC N Channel TV/he19 he said:
The Constitution . . . contains implied guarantees of freedom of speech and other communications and freedom of movement not only between the States and the States and the Territories but in and between every part of the Commonwealth. Such freedoms are fundamental to a democratic society. They are necessary for the proper operation of the system of rep resentative government at the federal level.20
Several members who are now part of the majority in Australian Capital Television conspicuously rejected Murphy J 's theory of an implied guarantee of freedom of communication.21 Some acknowledgment of the Court's sources for its new doc trine is due.22
The Legitimacy of the Advertising Ban
The prohibition on political advertising was assuredly a severe invasion of free speech. But we disagree with the opinion of Brennan J that the ban could be con sidered a legitimate restriction upon free speech. He said: 'It was open to the Par liament to conclude, as the experience of the majority of liberal democracies has demonstrated, that representative government can survive and flourish without paid political advertising on the electronic media during election periods.'23 He fully accepted the government's claim that the legislation was passed with die object of 'minimizing die risk of corrupdon or of reducing the untoward advantage of wealth on die formadon of political opinion '.24 Yet in reality the ban struck at die heart of democratic values: it prohibited po litical communication, the core of free speech in a liberal democratic society. The ban was imposed at the most important time in the political process: the period preceding elections. This is when voters most need information about candidates and parties, and when people most wish to speak. The legislation imposed a dis criminatory regime effectively allowing only those already represented in parliament to speak through one of die most important mediums of communication. Brennan J at no stage offered convincing evidence of die link between political advertising on television or radio and corruption or undue influence in the political process. The government might be entided (within limits) to address such a problem; but it did not establish even die existence of a problem. McHugh J 's comment on this issue is apposite:
If the Australian political process can be corrupted by the cost of political advertising, those bent on corrupting that process will not lack opportuni ties to achieve dieir ends even if electronic political advertising is prohibited during an election period. As the Supreme Court of die United States pointed out . . . 'virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.'25
It was argued diat television advertising debases or trivialises political debate. Even if this is true, it does not constitute a sufficient reason for banning it from po litical debate. The best way of ensuring that false ideas are exposed as false is to allow them to be aired openly. As United States Supreme Court judge Oliver Wendell Holmes observed long ago: 'the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . for the best test of trudi is the power of diought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market'.26 If the people do not like the mes sages given in a political party's advertising they may exercise their choice accord ingly at die ballot box.
Brennan J also invoked the spectre of the destruction of representative democ racy if the ban were not upheld. He said: 'if performance of the duties of members of the Parliament were to be subverted by obligations to large benefactors or if the parties to which they belong were to trade their commitment to published policies in exchange for funds to conduct expensive campaigns, no curial decree could, and no executive action would, restore representative democracy to the Australian peo ple. '27 This statement invites two comments. First, when he argues in support of the compatibility of the ban with liberal democracy, Brennan J neglects the converse of what he says about die destruction of representative democracy. This is that the United States and odier nations allowing freedom of speech in these matters have not ceased to be representative democracies or succumbed to dictatorship. The onus must be upon those seeking to defend a prohibition upon speech to justify its necessity. The evidence that televised political advertisements were somehow un dermining Australian democracy is insufficient.
Second, it is very difficult indeed to see how this statement by Brennan J in any way justifies a ban on electoral advertising. Accepting for the sake of argument the likelihood of corruption attributable to the need for campaign donations, the target in such a case ought surely to be political donations rather than a medium of com munication. Even if it is accepted that the great expense of broadcast advertising is particularly likely to create a sense of obligation on the part of political parties, it is the financial factor that is the problem rather than die speech itself.
Like Brennan J, Mason CJ was also prepared to assume for die purpose of de ciding the case that all of the Commonwealth's contentions were true. He assumed that die need to raise considerable amounts of money to conduct election cam paigns could create a risk of corruption and undue influence; that die wealdiy have an advantage in utilising this medium of communication; and that short election commercials may 'trivialise' political debate.28 Yet he found that the ban was still unjustifiable.
An Alternative to an Implied Right
For die reasons mentioned above, we strongly espouse the Court's opinion that the federal government's ban upon political advertising was a violation of free speech. W e do not, however, support the manner in which it reached its conclusion that the relevant legislative provisions were invalid. Yet if die High Court had wished to de cide the political advertising case on a narrower ground, it could have held that the relevant legislative provision violated a different implication diat is at least supported by current audiority. This implication is the prohibition that was applied in die Melbourne Corporation case.29
The Melbourne Corporation prohibition involves two tests. The first is a dis crimination test: legislation must not discriminate against or between the States. The advertising prohibition certainly passed this test. The prohibition upon State political advertising was part of a general legal regime; it did not single out the States or a State. The second test is a preservation test: legislation must not destroy or impair the capacity of the States to function. The legislation failed this test because it prohibited political advertising in relation to State electoral processes. Indeed, it prevented the States from reaching the electorate through electronic advertising even during a referendum campaign that might confer increased legislative power upon the Commonwealth.30 The High Court could therefore have concluded that the legislation unconstitu tionally inhibited the workings of the States, and could have partially invalidated the legislation on this ground.
McHugh J31 and Brennan J32 correctly applied the preservation test to invali date the legislation as applied to State electoral processes. As McHugh J stated, its 'immediate object IwasJ to control the States and their people in the exercise of their constitutional functions'.33 McHugh J argued that the continuance of the States as independent legal entities with their own constitutions and parliaments required that Commonwealth legislative power did not extend to interference in the electoral processes of the States, subject to a clear contrary intention in the Consti tution.34
Furthermore, rather than containing an implied right of political communica tion, die Constitution contains in s.92 an express freedom of interstate trade, com merce and intercourse that, but for the Court's recent negation of much of the ef fect of that guarantee, would have crippled the Commonwealth's prohibition of po litical advertising. In Barley Marketing Board (NSW ) v Normanj35 the High Court decisively rejected the individual rights theory of s.92, according to which the Con stitution is breached if governmental regulation impedes a person's right to inter state communication. Because of national networking most television and radio broadcasting could be considered interstate broadcasting. If the High Court had not restrictively interpreted s.92, the political advertising ban could easily have been invalidated for violation of an express constitutional prohibition. It is ironic that as a consequence of the Court's earlier restrictive interpretation of an express right enshrined in s.92,36 the Court was later compelled to invent an implied right to freedom of political communication. 
